Price-setting mixed duopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: substitutive, independent and complementary goods by Ohnishi, Kazuhiro
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Price-setting mixed duopoly,
subsidization and the order of firms’
moves: substitutive, independent and
complementary goods
Ohnishi, Kazuhiro
Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan
August 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/105654/
MPRA Paper No. 105654, posted 30 Jan 2021 08:41 UTC
 1
 
Price-setting mixed duopoly, subsidization and the 
order of firms’ moves: substitutive, independent 





Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan 
 
Abstract 
  This study examines a price-setting mixed duopoly with production subsidies and 
demonstrates that under the optimal production subsidy of each of substitutive, 
independent and complementary goods, profits and economic welfare are respectively 
identical in the three regimes of (i) a public firm and a private firm simultaneously set 
prices, (ii) the public firm acts as a leader, and (iii) both firms act simultaneously as 
profit-maximizers. 
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1. Introduction 
  The theoretical work by White (1996) examines the role of production subsidies in a 
quantity-setting mixed oligopoly market and presents the following main results. If 
production subsidies are utilized before and after privatization, profits, consumer surplus 
and economic welfare are not changed. On the other hand, if production subsidies are 
utilized only before privatization, there is always a reduction in economic welfare. 
Poyago-Theotoky (2001) extends White’s (1996) Cournot-Nash model to a Stackelberg 
model and demonstrates that the optimal production subsidy is identical regardless of 
whether (i) a public firm and private firms choose their quantity levels simultaneously, (ii) 
the public firm acts as a quantity leader, or (iii) all firms move simultaneously as 
profit-maximizers. Myles (2002) extends Poyago-Theotoky’s (2001) model of linear 
demand to a mixed oligopoly model of general inverse demand and cost functions and 
shows that the result is essentially similar to that obtained by Poyago-Theotoky (2001). In 
addition, Hashimzade, Khodavaisi and Myles (2007) extend the works by White (1996), 
Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002) and examine both quantity and price 
competition in an oligopoly with substitutive goods. They show that under the optimal 
subsidy, profits, prices, outputs and economic welfare are respectively identical regardless 
of the nature of the competition. 
  In this present paper, we study the role that production subsidies play in a price-setting 
duopoly market comprising a public firm and a private firm. We consider substitutive, 
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independent and complementary goods and examine the following three regimes: (i) the 
public and private firms move simultaneously, (ii) the public firm acts as a price leader, 
and (iii) both firms act simultaneously as profit-maximizers. We solve the three games 
and demonstrate that under the optimal subsidy of each of substitutive, independent and 
complementary goods, both firms’ profits, prices, outputs and economic welfare are 
respectively identical regardless of the nature of the competition. 
  The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. 
Section 3 presents the results of this study. Section 4 presents examples of the results. 




  Let us consider a model composed of a welfare-maximizing public firm and a 
profit-maximizing private firm. In the remainder of this paper, subscripts 0 and 1 
represent the public firm and the private firm, respectively. The model is from 
Bárcena-Ruiz and Sedano (2011). 








a b p bp
q i j i j
b
, 
where (0, )a  and ( 1,1)b . If ( 1,0)b , goods are complementary, if 0b , 
goods are independent, and if (0,1)b , goods are substitutive, 
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  Each firm’s profit is given by 
  ( ) ( 0,1)i i ip c s q i ,                                      (1) 
where (0, )c a  denotes the marginal cost of production and (0, )s  is the 
production subsidy rate. 
  Economic welfare is given by 
  0 1 0 1( )W CS s q q ,                                          (2) 
where 2 2 20 0 1 1 0 1[ 2 2 (1 )( )] / 2(1 )CS p bp p p a b a p p b  denotes consumer 
surplus. 
  We use subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept and the three games of the next 




  In this section, we consider the following three price-setting games: (a) mixed Bertrand 
duopoly, (b) private Bertrand duopoly, and (c) mixed Stackelberg duopoly. 
 
(a) Mixed Bertrand duopoly 
  There are two stages: in the first stage the government sets the production subsidy level 
to maximize economic welfare; in the second stage both firms simultaneously and 
independently choose their prices conditional on the production subsidy. The game is 
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solved by backward induction to obtain subgame perfect equilibrium values. Maximizing 
(1) and (2) simultaneously, we arrive at the second-stage equilibrium prices in terms of 
s : 
  MB0 2
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b
.          (3) 
  We now solve the first stage of the game. In the first stage, taking into account how 
firms will react to the subsidy, the government determines the welfare-maximizing 
subsidy: 
  MB (1 )( )s b a c .                                               (4) 
  From (3) and (4), we can derive the following subgame perfect equilibrium values: 
  MB MB0 1( ) ( )p s p s c ,                                             (5) 
  MB MB0 1( ) ( )
1
a c
q s q s
b











,                                     (7) 
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.                                                  (8) 
  Note that prices, outputs and profits are equalized between the public firm and the 
private firm. Also note that each firm’s profit is equal to the amount of subsidy it receives 
from the government. 
 
(b) Private Bertrand duopoly 
  In this game only, we assume that the public firm is privatized and maximizes its own 
profit. In stage one, the government decides the production subsidy level to maximize 
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economic welfare; in stage two, both firms simultaneously and independently choose 
their prices conditional on the production subsidy. Maximizing (1) simultaneously, we 






a b c s
p s
b
.                                            (9) 
  In stage one, the government decides the welfare-maximizing subsidy level: 
  PB MB(1 )( )s b a c s . 
  It happens that the optimal subsidy, prices, outputs, profits and economic welfare in this 
game are identical with those in the mixed Bertrand duopoly game. Therefore, 
expressions (5) – (8) also represent the relevant expressions for the private Bertrand 
duopoly game. 
 
(c) Mixed Stackelberg duopoly 
  We now consider the following three-stage game. In the first stage, the government 
chooses the production subsidy level. In the second stage, the public firm chooses its 






a b c s bp
p p s .                                       (10) 
  In the second stage, the public firm decides its price for a given subsidy level 
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and further we obtain 
  
2 2 3 2
MS
1 2
(1 )(2 ) (2 2 2 ) (2 )
( )
4 3
a b b c b b b s b
p s
b
.                 (12) 
  In the first stage, the government, anticipating how its choice of subsidy affects firms’ 
price choices, maximizes (2). The optimal subsidy is 
  MS MB PB(1 )( )s b a c s s . 
Prices, outputs, profits and economic welfare are identical to those obtained in (a) and (b), 
i.e. given by expressions (5) – (8). 
  Now we can state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Under each of substitutive, independent and complementary goods, the 
optimal subsidy, prices, outputs, profits and economic welfare are respectively identical in 
the three price-setting regimes of (i) the public firm acts simultaneously with the private 









4.1. Substitutive goods 
  In this subsection, we assume that 0.5b . Then the welfare-maximizing subsidy is 






  Substitution reveals the following values: 
  Subst Subst0 1( ) ( )p s p s c , 
  Subst Subst0 1
2( )
( ) ( )
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a c






( ) ( )
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a c
s s , 
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Subst 2( )( )
3
a c
W s . 
  Since each firm’s profit is equal to the amount of subsidy it receives from the 
government, economic welfare is equal to consumer surplus. 
 
4.2. Independent goods 
  If 0b , then we obtain the following values: 
  Indeps a c , 
  Indep Indep0 1( ) ( )p s p s c , 
  Indep Indep0 1( ) ( )q s q s a c , 
  Indep Indep 20 1( ) ( ) ( )s s a c , 
  Indep 2( ) ( )W s a c . 
  Notice that each firm’s profit, economic welfare and consumer surplus are equalized. 
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4.3. Complementary goods 






  Compl Compl0 1( ) ( )p s p s c , 
  Compl Compl0 1( ) ( ) 2( )q s q s a c , 
  Compl Compl 20 1( ) ( ) 3( )s s a c , 
  Compl 2( ) 2( )W s a c . 




  We have investigated the role that production subsidies play in a price-setting duopoly 
comprising a public firm and a private firm. We have considered the following three 
regimes: (i) the public and private firms choose their prices simultaneously, (ii) the public 
firm acts as a price leader, and (iii) both firms acts as profit-maximizers. In consequence, 
we have shown that under the optimal subsidy of each of substitutive, independent and 
complementary goods, prices, outputs, profits and economic welfare are respectively 
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